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The issue of the relationship between planning and 
the market has given rise to fruitless theoretical 
contention over the relative merits of central plan-
ning versus a laissez-faire market. At the practical 
level, this disagreement has manifested itself in 
sharp swings in policy, which at times have favoured 
State intervention while mistrusting private enter-
prise, and at other times have curtailed State action 
on the grounds that it is inherently ineffective and 
inappropriate. The author argues that one of the 
major lessons to be learned from the region's post-
war economic experiences is that a correct balance 
must be struck between the market and State action 
on the basis of an objective analysis of the strong and 
weak points of each. 
Rather than undertaking an exhaustive theoret-
ical inquiry into the relative merits of the market and 
planning, the author analyses the principal failures 
and successes of postwar economic policy in order to 
see what can be learned from them in regard to the 
relative advantages of each of these two elements. 
Based on the results of this examination, the author 
asserts that the main problems in the region during 
the past ten years have not been in those spheres 
which have traditionally been points of conflict 
between the market and planning {e.g., the selection 
of the most appropriate lines of production for each) 
or in the areas classified as typical shortcomings of 
the market (externalities in the actual sector of pro-
duction). Instead, they have arisen in spheres recog-
nized as being the responsibility of planning {the 
maintenance of basic macroeconomic equilibria and 
the progressive distribution of the fruits of develop-
ment) and in market defects which were not ade-
quately foreseen {excessive external indebtedness 
and the financial crisis of national capital markets). 
"Staff member of the Economic Development Div-
ision of ECI.AC. 
I 
The market and planning 
during the postwar period 
The advantages and disadvantages of a free 
market within the context of a mixed economy 
are well-known. Its main advantage is that, with 
only a minimum of parameters (i.e., prices), each 
individual's efforts are mobilized and channeled 
towards those sectors where production is in 
shortest supply (whose relative price is the high-
est) and use is made of those factors that are in 
the most abundant supply (whose relative cost is 
the lowest). Each individual's efforts to further 
his own interests are therefore channeled by a 
free and competitive market towards the satis-
faction of social needs (the "invisible hand") on 
an efficient basis (i.e., at a lower cost). 
The market's disadvantages come to light 
when prices cease to reflect social needs for any 
of a variety of reasons, such as: interference with 
the market (monopolies and monopsonies), 
positive externalities (education and technologi-
cal development) or negative ones (pollution) 
which are not figured into private costs or benef-
its; indivisibilities (public goods, price stability, 
adequate overall demand, streets, public order, 
defence) which benefit all regardless of their 
personal efforts; the lack of important markets 
or their insufficient development (the virtual 
absence of long-term capital markets and future 
markets); duplication by the market of the initial 
distribution of income through an allocation of 
resources that is not guided by the consideration 
of whether or not the resulting income is suffi-
cient for a decent life; and the discounting of the 
future (due to uncertainty about others' plans or 
to a failure to take the needs of future genera-
tions into due consideration). This would appear 
to be a justification for the existence of a State 
which not only establishes the "rules of the 
game" and maintains order, but which also per-
forms fundamental economic functions such as 
maintaining basic macroeconomic equilibria 
(price stability, full employment and balanced 
external accounts); redistributing income (accel-
erating the trickle-down effect of economic 
development or minimizing absolute decreases 
in the incomes of the most needy); promoting 
development (by intervening in markets in 
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order to make corrections and to steer them in 
the direction of the objectives of the develop-
ment strategy); and producing goods (public, 
monopolistic or strategic) which involve multi-
ple externalities as regards the economy. 
Regardless of whether they view the State's 
economic role as being dirigiste (controlling the 
private sector) or subsidiary (strengthening or 
supplementing this sector), all the governments 
of the region have taken action in these four 
areas during the postwar period. In most, the 
central government, together with State enter-
prises, has directly produced from 20% to 30% 
of the GDP and accounted for even higher per-
centages of investment. In all of them, the State 
has made use of the traditional monetary, fiscal 
and tariff instruments and controlled the 
exchange rate. In most, in has either set or 
guided interest rates and played a large part in 
the direct allocation of credit. In the majority, it 
has set at least some prices of essential goods 
(foodstuffs, fuel, transport, public services) and 
sometimes a wide range of them, including retail 
prices and prices by national region. In other 
words, State intervention has been quite exten-
sive, if not always equally effective. 
Nobody has questioned the State's essential, 
if not exclusive, role in the regulation of macro-
economic variables and distribution. Nonethe-
less, a number of serious errors have been 
committed precisely in this traditional and 
unquestionably State sphere which point to 
shortcomings in the planning process. With few 
exceptions inflation has worsened, reaching 
three digits in various cases, even in countries 
which had generally had only moderate inflation 
before. Deficits in external accounts have 
reached excessive proportions in many countries 
and, as a result of the stabilization and adjust-
ment policies they have adopted, unemployment 
has risen to record levels. Basic macroeconomic 
balances have been managed poorly not only 
during periods of external crisis (1980-1983) but 
also, in many instances, during more prosperous 
times (1960-1973). In addition to all of this, even 
during such times and even without any inter-
vening macroeconomic disequilibria of major 
significance, very little has been achieved with 
respect to income distribution. On the contrary, 
while absolute income levels have improved in 
almost all the countries, these increases have 
tended to favour higher-income groups. 
There has also been a great deal of discussion 
about the scope of the State's promotional and 
entrepreneurial functions, i.e., what is the best 
way (or degree of intervention) to promote 
development and what are the proper limits as 
regards the State's entrepreneurial activity. For a 
series of reasons, two ideas have gained sway in 
most of the countries of the region: that the State 
should undertake development planning and 
thus at least rationalize its own activities, if not 
mobilize all economic agents for the achieve-
ment of that goal (a view which has resulted in 
the proliferation of development plans); and 
that the State itself should manage these activi-
ties, especially in the extractive and basic-inputs 
industries, which, because they involve such a 
large volume of sales or because they require a 
great deal of capital and entail externalities that 
are just too important for the economy as a 
whole, should not be left in the hands of domes-
tic or transnational consortia without a proper 
national counterweight. As a result, from the 
1960s onwards, the number and economic 
importance of State enterprises began to grow at 
such an extraordinary pace that by the 1980s 
non-financial State enterprises were producing 
between 15% and 20% of the GDP in Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Chile and Venezuela, 
even though the number of State enterprises in 
many of these countries began to drop after 
1975. In line with this idea, export-oriented 
extractive activities have been nationalized or 
placed under firm State control in various 
countries. 
It is not within the scope of this article to 
assess these two tendencies, which, for all that, 
do have a logical justification. What should be 
pointed out, however, is that in most cases plan-
ning has not worked very well. Apart from the 
publication of a plan, in most instances the plan-
ning done has not included the identification of 
specific measures for achieving the goals that 
have been set. In contravention of the basic prin-
ciple of planning —that there is an instrument 
for each objective— there has been an over-
supply of objectives and an undersupply of 
instruments. Rather than there being true plan-
ning, the short-term sectoral programmes of the 
Ministries, the Central Bank or the Office of the 
Budget have been relied upon. The operationali-
zation of comprehensive (as opposed to merely 
sectoral) long-term programmes providing fo* 
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concrete and consistent measures has been com-
pletely lacking. State intervention has thus 
tended to be shortsighted, piecemeal and unco-
ordinated. Be that as it may, since State interven-
tion had been just as or more unco-ordinated, 
piecemeal, ad hoc and inconsistent in the past, it 
is quite possible that the net effect of this greater 
awareness of planning has been a positive one 
during the postwar period. Indeed, between 
1950 and 1980 Latin America's economic growth 
was strong and sustained (over 5% annually) 
and well above its traditional rate prior to that 
time. 
The expansion of State enterprises was due 
to both situational and planned factors (e.g., the 
absorption of bankrupt companies, the provi-
sion of services to State enterprises). Although 
their economic performance has not always been 
optimal (since they also pursue other ends, such 
as employment, regional support, and keeping 
rates low), their expansion nonetheless did 
result in a sharp increase in investment and 
national production capacity. However, their 
great drawbacks has been that a large part of this 
investment was financed through external bor-
rowing, rather than with internal funds or their 
own resources, as they took advantage of the 
high degree of international liquidity and their 
ability to obtain State-guaranteed loans. It is 
estimated, for example, that 60% of Brazil's 
external debt was incurred by State enterprises,1 
although they were often serving only as a 
foreign-exchange conduit for the Central Bank. 
All this led up to the economic hecatomb 
which began in 1973: the external and interna] 
indebtedness that culminated in the external dis-
equilibria and financial crises of 1981-1983 and 
the costly (and recessionary) shock adjustment 
programmes mounted to deal with these exter-
nal imbalances. This was a resounding failure of 
the market system which few planners had been 
able to foresee, at least in its true proportions. In 
fact, up until de 1970s, the international capital 
market had been inadequate ever since it had 
crashed during the Great Crisis 40 years earlier. 
Internal capital markets, for their part, were 
fragmented and underdeveloped, especially in so 
far as long-term instruments were concerned. 
•IPKA/ECLAC, Empresas es caw is e política económica, 
Planejatnento e controle do setor de empresas estalais, Brasilia, 
1983, p. 19. 
Thus, much of the allocation of credit was 
administered and a large part of long-term funds 
were self-generated. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that when international liquidity rose after 
1973, capital markets were seen to be highly 
inadequate. They were able to recycle the inflow 
of petrodollars (which was the primary need in 
the beginning), but in doing so they neglected to 
ensure that the loans were backed by a concomit-
ant expansion in debt-servicing capacity. The 
international banks contented themselves with 
guarantees for the huge sums that were involved 
rather than analysing the viability of the invest-
ment projects in question. In their anxiousness 
to obtain funds so that they could avoid or post-
pone adjustment programmes, most govern-
ments gave these guarantees. Meanwhile, 
private economic groups which had access to 
international funds had an enormous incentive 
to borrow —not so much in order to invest as to 
recycle the funds internally or to purchase 
domestic assets. 
No agent, then, had a strong interest in 
ensuring that private gain coincided with socie-
ty's gain or that this borrowing was accompanied 
by a complementary expansion in the country's 
productive capacity to service the debt. Quite to 
the contrary, a large part of the borrowed funds 
ultimately went for consumption (once assets 
had been purchased) or to capital flight (i.e., the 
gains were privatized while, on the basis of the 
State guarantee, the financial exposure was 
socialized) or was spent on armaments. Nor 
were all the funds that were invested always 
channeled to projects having a suitable rate of 
return, either because the projects had been 
designed before the crisis and had therefore been 
based on different relative prices and on the 
assumption of a buoyant domestic market, or 
because the initial euphoria was so great that 
there was a willingness to finance even marginal 
projects. 
When the crisis struck, the weakness of both 
the international and domestic markets was 
exposed. The international market proved to be 
entirely pro-cyclical: there was an inflow of capi-
tal so long as the terms of trade were favourable, 
interest rates were low and the centre's demand 
remained strong, but when these indicators rev-
ersed, so did the flow of capital, regardless of 
how many internal adjustments the indebted 
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countries made. The domestic markets revealed 
just how intertwined these loans were among 
banks and enterprises having interlocking assets 
and just how little use it was during a time of 
external crisis to have guarantees which did not 
generate foreign exchange. 
Although these problems appear to have 
been more serious in the countries which liberal-
ized their financial markets during this period, 
thereby encouraging external borrowing for 
domestic intermediation or for the purchase of 
assets rather than for investment, the problem 
of overindebtedness has been quite general in 
the region and has not been confined only to the 
countries of the Southern Cone which applied a 
liberalization policy. In the other countries, the 
State tended to give its guarantee for the bulk of 
the private external debt, which did not occur in 
the Southern Cone. With few exceptions (espe-
cially Colombia) the countries did not consider it 
useful to control the flow or use of the funds 
borrowed. Most of them encouraged it, including 
those that had the least need to do so, such as the 
petroleum-exporting countries. The pre-
existing regulation of domestic capital markets 
proved to be inadequate for dealing with the 
sums in question and the new financial tech-
niques that had come into use, and almost all 
underwent severe financial crises; ultimately it 
became necessary for the State to provide strong 
In most of the countries of the region, we no 
longer talk about whether a centrally-planned or 
market economy is better, but rather about what 
the best combination of the two in a mixed 
economy would be. Nor do we discuss whether 
production and distribution have to be con-
trolled in order to fulfil social aims; the need for 
this is recognized by almost everyone. What does 
have to be decided, however, is how much of this 
control should be carried out by invisible, imper-
sonal or indirect means (by the market) and how 
much through visible, personal and direct alloca-
tion (through an explicit plan). 
support for the national banking system or to 
convert it entirely to State ownership (Mexico). 
There are few today who would question the 
need to link the rate of external indebtedness to 
its socially productive use. The sad thing is that 
so few foresaw this need, not only in the coun-
tries which were committed to liberalization at 
all costs, but also in the more dirigiste countries. 
Not even planning's staunchest advocates pre-
dicted this enormous failure of the capital 
market. This was the great sin of omission com-
mitted by the planning of the time. 
Although the postwar period has been the 
most prosperous in the region's history (a situa-
tion to which the improvement of State and 
private management has surely contributed), the 
conclusion to be drawn is that the main prob-
lems which have arisen have fallen outside the 
scope of the traditional canons of analysis and 
debate concerning the proper roles of the market 
and planning. Two of the most serious short-
comings have been precisely in spheres recog-
nized as being the exclusive preserve of the State 
(the maintenance of basic macroeconomic equi-
libria and the improvement of income distribu-
tion) and are therefore attributable to errors 
committed by planning. The third major failure 
—the crisis of external indebtedness— was due 
to a lack of foresight and was hence an error of 
omission. 
The general shortcomings of the market are 
well-known, although it is not always easy to 
determine their relative importance before the 
fact. State action also has its flaws. Therefore, 
what has to be ascertained is how serious the 
market's defects are, not in relation to some ideal 
form of State action, but in relation to State 
action that is not always either effective or 
disinterested. 
1. Recent lessons concerning planning 
Firstly, it must be remembered that the formula-
tion of plans in not necessarily the same thing as 
II 
Lessons of the recent past 
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planning. It is only the beginning of a planning 
process, not its end. If instruments are lacking or 
if there are too many objectives, as has been the 
case so often in the past, or if these instruments 
are not shaped into concrete measures, then 
genuine planning will not take place. 
Secondly, planning is not measured by the 
number of interventions undertaken, but by 
their quality and consistency. In many countries 
there has often been intervention in a multitude 
of spheres, but it has not always been consistent. 
For example, in the late 1970s in Brazil, almost 
unlimited credit was given to the agricultural 
sector (an amount equal to 80% of the agricultu-
ral GDP, on average) in order to promote this 
sector's production. Since the interest rates on 
these credits were markedly negative, the 
implicit subsidy was enormous. Nevertheless, 
the sector did not appear to derive any clear 
benefit from these measures because other poli-
cies were working against it, such as the 
exchange rate, which tended to be undervalued, 
and industrial tariffs that placed agriculture in a 
disadvantageous competitive position. Some 
agricultural prices were controlled (in order to 
counter inflation), others were supported (to 
stimulate production), some agricultural exports 
were taxed (to control their external prices), and 
the export of other agricultural products was 
discouraged or prohibited (in order to regulate 
the domestic market). Given this complex pic-
ture of frequently conflicting policies, it was dif-
ficult to determine which activities were, in the 
end, helped and which were harmed (except in 
the case of the many activities that were subject 
to the general disincentives but did not enjoy 
specific benefits) and whether or not these poli-
cies served a social purpose. In this case, rather 
than being an expression of good planning, the 
large number of interventions which took place 
hindered this process. 
By the same token, a lack of direct controls 
does not necessarily mean that there is insuffi-
cient planning. Chile's stabilization policy, at 
least since 1976, is a clear example of planned 
management (effective and consistent in pursu-
ing its objectives) despite the fact that the 
number of interventions was kept to a min-
imum. The authorities made use of the market 
by applying a tariff drawback while fixing the 
exchange rate in order to hold down domestic 
price increases, and so did not find it necessary to 
place direct controls on the vast range of prices 
in the national market. The government also 
managed to introduce major structural (as 
opposed to merely marginal) changes by apply-
ing market prices and criteria in many spheres of 
the economy and society normally removed from 
these factors (e.g., State enterprises, universities, 
social security and even many aspects of the 
health system). Thus, intervention may be held 
to a minimum and nonetheless have an enor-
mous impact. 
Thirdly, direct planning need not cover 
everything. It can be partial in terms of both its 
time span and its content. For example, stabili-
zation policies and adjustment programmes are 
often highly co-ordinated and operative in 
respect of specific goals even though they may be 
designed only as short-term programmes or may 
be limited to a few goals (e.g., to reduce inflation 
or to place the balance of payments in equili-
brium). This indicates that it can be more advan-
tageous to plan (directly) how to eliminate 
certain critical bottlenecks than to plan (directly) 
on a comprehensive basis. 
Fourthly, planning is not always successful. 
This is a self-evident truth which is nevertheless 
often forgotten. Hence, it is frequently more 
beneficial to improve the planning process in 
those spheres where it is clearly required (e.g., 
improving adjustment and stabilization pro-
grammes with a view to minimizing their usual 
regressive and recessionary impacts, or the sav-
ing and investment system, or income redistri-
bution) before turning to problem areas in 
which the market's flaws are more tolerable, 
inasmuch as the human and information resour-
ces available for planning are also limited and 
the instruments that are at hand are not always 
suitable, in addition to the fact that each new 
intervention involves a negative social external-
ity. As the analysis becomes more complex 
—since the policy can no longer be assessed on a 
partial basis but instead needs to be evaluated 
from a balanced, overall vantage point— the 
probability of error in the actual design of the 
policy increases. 
Fifthly, the fewer and more clearly-defined 
the objectives are, the more an effort is made to 
channel (rather than counter) the activities of 
private economic agents, the more general the 
policies are, and the smaller the number of direct 
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controls, the more effective planning will tend to> 
be. 
For example, controlling the price of a given 
foodstuff initially lowers its cost to consumers 
(the desired effect), but it ultimately creates a 
shortage by discouraging production. Since price 
controls do not stop the producer from changing 
over to a different product, the policy fails. It 
would therefore be necessary to combine price 
controls with a compensatory subsidy for pro-
ducers in order to increase production of the 
foodstuff in question, since this is the only sure 
method of lowering its price over the long term. 
If the objective is to redistribute income, then a 
tax on all entrepreneurial activity will be more 
practical than price controls, which will only 
redistribute income so long as the producers stay 
in the product line whose price is being con-
trolled. Finally, it is better (from the standpoint 
of being able to assess the consequences) to con-
trol a key price, such as the exchange rate, than to 
control the prices of a large number of products, 
whose indirect effects would be difficult to pre-
dict and whose administration would be more 
complicated. 
2. Recent lessons concerning the market 
Firstly, in so far as the efficiency of the market is 
concerned, the more price inelastic production 
is, the more costly it will be to use the market and 
the price system to allocate resources, since 
extreme changes in prices will be necessary in 
order to bring output to the desired levels. In 
order to prevent producers from obtaining such 
quasi-rents and to speed up production to the 
targeted levels, planning and the administrative 
allocation of resources are necessary. This has 
been one of the major arguments used during the 
postwar period by advocates of the utilization of 
price and exchange-rate controls and of direct 
incentives (credit subsidies, tariffs, minimum 
guarantee prices) as a means of dealing with the 
inelasticity of supply that has been said to exist 
in agriculture and the supposed inelasticity of 
the supply and demand for exports. The strong 
expansion seen in the volume of Latin American 
exports, especially during the 1970s (7% annu-
ally for the non-petroleum-exporting countries) 
casts doubt upon the validity of this hypothesis. 
In point of fact, exports do appear to be sensitive 
to prices, inasmuch as a policy of maintaining 
the exchange rate at realistic levels seems to 
have been one of the most important factors in 
accounting for the boom in exports, particularly 
in non-traditional exports, during this period. 
A similar, although less pronounced, trend 
has been observed in agriculture. The region's 
output rose at an annual per capital rate of 0.8% 
in 1950-1980, with growth ranging from 0.7% 
in the 1950s to 1% annually in the 1970s. The 
production and export of agricultural products 
have, then, turned out to be sensitive to prices 
and to the exchange rate. Brazilian soya and 
orange concentrate, Chilean fresh fruit, Colom-
bian flowers and Uruguayan rice are some of the 
new products which have shown rapid growth 
and a great degree of penetration into external 
markets. 
As production and exports have shown 
themselves to be more sensitive to prices, and as 
entrepreneurs have proved to be more capable of 
penetrating external markets (both achieve-
ments of the past few decades), the pricing sys-
tem, along with its incentives, has become a 
more suitable means of mobilizing and allocat-
ing resources for socially useful purposes. 
Secondly, the closer the economy is to full 
employment and to an external balance, the bet-
ter the market will function; and it becomes less 
and less efficient as pivotal indicators (the 
exchange rate, interest rates, real wages) move 
further away from their values of equilibrium. 
This is why it is vital for economic policy to 
maintain the basic macroeconomic indicators in 
balance. Sharp fluctuations in the values of these 
indicators from one year to the next —as have 
occurred in many countries in recent years— 
disorient the market and give rise to destabiliz-
ing behaviour because these values reflect 
serious distortions between social and private 
values which are, in turn, caused by severe imbal-
ances in basic markets. For example, negative 
interest rates —which have been observed so 
often during the postwar period— do not even 
remotely reflect the shortage of capital in the 
countries of the region; nor do real annual inter-
est rates of 20%-30%, which have also been 
seen in some countries. Similarly, variations of 
from 30% to 50% in the effective real exchange 
rate serve only to completely disorient economic 
agents as regards the real comparative advan-
tages of the economy. Such sharp variations cor-
respond to transitory situations (e.g., large but 
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short-lived inflows of external capital or the use 
of exchange policy for anti-inflationary ends) 
rather than to balanced positions. 
Thirdly, the longer the time period allowed 
for the achievement of objectives, the better the 
market will function. The dynamics of transition 
from one point of equilibrium to another often 
involve divergent movements (which may 
either exceed the target or fail to reach it) rather 
than always taking the form of movements 
which systematically converge towards equili-
brium. During these transitions, the State's 
orientation is particularly important (the neces-
sary posture being one which furthers these 
movements towards equilibrium rather than 
repressing them), and this appears to be espe-
cially true in the case of anti-inflationary pro-
grammes, in which the values of some variables 
have so often been seen to hang back while those 
of uncontrolled variables overshoot the desired 
levels. 
Fourthly, the less distorted prices are, the 
better the market will function. Although there 
is an assumption that, over the long term, the 
free price is the undistorted price (i.e., that the 
private price measures social value), the free 
price is not necessarily the same as the social 
price; indeed, the two may be very far apart due 
to induced or natural market distortions, to a 
large number of fragmented markets (the labour 
With the blessing of hindsight, it is always easy 
to win the battles of the past, but the point here 
is to prepare for those of tomorrow. For exam-
ple, one of the major failures of the 1970s during 
the period of great international liquidity was 
not to have foreseen the external and internal 
capital markets' inability to recycle and absorb so 
large an amount of funds efficiently. Today we 
would be able to rectify that error, but what 
would we gain by doing so when the problem to 
be dealt with during the coming ten years will 
surely not be to control the inflow of capital but 
rather to increase it? 
and capital markets) or to the absence of a 
market (a long-term capital market or a futures 
market). This would be a justification for inter-
vention aimed at improving its operation. 
The identification of the free price with the 
undistorted price of equilibrium has frequently 
resulted in market prices that are far removed 
from their equilibrium values. In effect, the 
market price balances supply and demand in a 
market, but it is at its point of equilibrium only if 
the other markets are also in equilibrium. If they 
are not, the price that balances one particular 
market may be even further away from its true 
equilibrium. A typical case in point within the 
region occurred in relation to the labour market. 
Even though real wages fell sharply in some 
countries, unemployment rose, and this tended 
to depress wages even further (thus distancing 
them from their long-term equilibrium value). 
This was due to the fact that the cause of unem-
ployment in this case was not an excessively high 
real wage, but rather inordinately high price 
levels, which depressed sales and thus hiring as 
well. Therefore, unemployment was a reflection 
of an imbalance in the market for goods (inflated 
prices) rather than in the labour market. The 
solution for this unemployment problem was 
not to lower real wages but to lower prices in 
order to raise the demand for goods and the 
consequent demand for labour. 
Although we cannot predict what will 
happen during the next ten years, the region's 
future will clearly be influenced by the disequili-
brium and the servicing of the external debt. The 
most critical shortage will be that of foreign 
exchange, and there will consequently be an 
urgent need for measures that will increase 
exports, further import substitution, extend the 
term or reduce the amount of the debt service, 
speed up the inflow of capital and prevent capi-
tal flight. The foreign exchange market will be 
the critical one on which all economic policy will 
have to be focused, since the resolution of all the 
m 
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other problems (such as unemployment) will in 
large part be dependent upon this factor. 
Furthermore, since private national groups' 
financial standing with their creditors will pre-
sumably continue to be rather poor for a long 
time to come, most of the intermediation neces-
sary in order to bring external funds into the 
economy will have to be carried out by the State 
and with its guarantee. 
It is also probable that internal savings will 
have to be greater than national savings for 
some time; in other words, in order to service the 
debt, it will be necessary to save more than is 
invested. This means that it will be very difficult 
to raise national savings (and investment) above 
its level of the past decade; indeed, it is possible 
that it will decrease in order to ease the current 
depression of consumption. As a consequence of 
this obligatory austerity, another national prior-
ity will have to be either to increase internal 
savings as much as possible or to improve the 
yield of investment, or some combination of the 
two, if rates of economic growth similar to those 
of past decades are to be attained. 
Moreover, as it may well be more unlikely 
that the product and consumption will expand as 
rapidly as they have in the pat, it will be more 
necessary than ever to base distributive efforts 
not only on general economic growth but also on 
complementary measures aimed specifically at 
raising the consumption levels of the neediest 
groups. 
In addition, the evolution of the interna-
tional economy over the past 15 years suggests 
that precautions will have to be taken against 
abrupt and unstable movements. Sharp fluctua-
tions in the terms of trade, real interest rates, 
exchange rates and relative prices (energy and 
other raw materials) may be the rule rather than 
the exception. This would seem to indicate that 
emphasis should be placed on responsible and 
flexible planning systems. 
In order to achieve these objectives, it will be 
essential to maintain the basic macroeconomic 
equilibria, and particularly the external balance, 
inasmuch as this is the exclusive responsibility of 
the State, a good in and of itself, and a sine qua 
non for the effective operation of the market. A 
further challenge will be to attain this external 
balance while minimizing the recessionary and 
distributive costs traditionally associated with 
stabilization and adjustment programmes. His-
tory clearly shows that, even though economic 
growth does not always ensure a better distribu-
tion, the severest declines in living standards 
have accompanied periods of recession, which 
are often brought on by stabilization and adjust-
ment programmes. 
Finally, planning aimed at promoting 
dynamic development should focus on a few 
crucial areas: savings (raising it) and investment 
(improving its allocation), and shifting produc-
tion towards tradeable goods. In view of the 
State's limited capacity for intervention, this 
activity should be directed towards planning 
State production and investment rather than the 
private sector's, since at present the former is 
not guided by the criteria of the market or of 
social planning. In regard to the private sector, 
intervention should, for reasons of feasibility 
and administrative effectiveness, focus on 
orienting the key prices in the economy (basi-
cally those of the factors markets, interest rates, 
the exchange rate, effective protection and 
wages) and, in so far as possible, there should be 
rules governing such intervention, with inter-
vention in the market for goods being under-
taken only in exceptional cases. 
It will not be a question, then, of planning 
versus the market, but rather one of improving 
the way in which both the markets and State 
intervention or direct planning function. Quite 
probably what will have to be done is not to 
expand the sphere of State intervention, but 
rather to focus it and refine it within a foreseea-
ble future context of foreign exchange shortages 
and austerity. 
